We analyze innovation in emerging and newly industrialized economies over the past 30 years, with the emphasis being on Asian economies. We use US patent data to study how the innovative capabilities of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore have expanded in relation to emerging economies in Asia and Latin America. We then carry out a sector-level analysis of innovation for South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, India and China. We also study the relative importance of foreign multinationals, business groups, individuals, domestic firms and research institutes in innovation. Finally, we study the overall concentration of innovative activity in Asian economies.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, Asian economies like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have achieved high growth rates (Table 1) . Proponents of the "accumulation" view of growth (Krugman, 1994; Young, 1995; Collins and Bosworth, 1996) argue that this is merely the result of high savings and investments that have made it possible for these countries to better use technologies inherited from the world's technological leaders. In contrast, proponents of the "assimilation" view (Dahlman, 1994; Hobday, 1995; Nelson and Pack, 1998; Kim, 1998) insist that the critical source of growth in East Asia has been productivity growth resulting from the learning, entrepreneurship and innovation that these economies have gone through, which has made not only adoption of foreign technologies but also development of indigenous technologies possible.
In this paper, we investigate the extent of innovation in East Asia. While doing so obviously does not conclusively settle the assimilation versus accumulation debate, evidence of substantial increase in innovation-related capabilities lends some support to the plausibility of the assimilation view. We examine patent data to study if these economies have built indigenous technological and entrepreneurial capabilities. Most of previous literature using patent data has focused on patenting activity of developed countries (e.g. US and western European countries) because the extent of patenting from other countries was often too small to be considered statistically meaningful. However, in the past two decades, many other countries have also started to patent heavily, opening up an opportunity for more research using patent data.
We find that Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore now have a much higher US patenting Table 1 Annualized real GDP growth rate (%) : 1970-1999 Recipient countries 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 Newly industrialized economies Taiwan activity than the emerging economies both in Asia (India, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) and in Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela). The results are most dramatic for Taiwan and South Korea, though less so for Hong Kong and Singapore. Taiwan and South Korea appear to be far ahead of Hong Kong and Singapore in innovation, indicating that the "Asian Tigers" might actually differ in the extent of innovation and hence possibly in the mechanisms that have led to their rapid growth. It appears that Taiwan already saw a surge in patenting activity in the late 1980s, while the rapid increase in patenting is primarily a 1990s phenomenon for South Korea. Hong Kong, Singapore and India have also recently begun to increase the extent of their US patenting, though the remaining emerging economies in our sample do not show any evidence of significantly exceeding the average overall growth rates in patenting. All the results mentioned here continue to hold even if we account for differences in exports across countries. Sector-level analysis sheds additional light on innovation in Asia. The areas of specialization for any given country are found to be somewhat persistent, evolving only slowly over time. Both South Korea and Taiwan have managed to gradually shift more towards fast-growing industries. Even though South Korea has been a little behind Taiwan in the aggregate patenting activity, it has been quicker in making a transition to fast-growing industries and also achieving a higher degree of specialization. Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have seen a fall in the overall degree of specialization, even though they have also managed a transition towards the fast-growing sectors.
We also compare the sources of innovation across the Asian economies. We find that the relative contribution to innovation by multinational subsidiaries has been highest in Singapore and India, minimal in Taiwan and South Korea, and something in between for Hong Kong and China. Business groups have been behind more than 80% of the patents arising from South Korea in the 1990s, while their contribution in Taiwan has been less than 4%. The importance of individual inventors seems to be declining over time across all countries. However, they still own 59% of the recent patents in Taiwan but a mere 7% in South Korea. Individual inventors are also important in Hong Kong and China, but not so much for Singapore and India. We also study how concentration of innovative activity differs across different economies by calculating the fraction of the country's patents held by its top 50 assignees. This number is found to be the highest for South Korea (85%), followed by Singapore (70%), India (63%), Hong Kong (32%), Taiwan (26%) and finally China (24%).
The paper is divided into the following sections. In Section 2, we summarize our data and methodology for comparing innovation across countries. In Section 3, aggregate data for the past three decades is used to compare the newly industrialized countries with other emerging countries in Asia and Latin America. The remaining sections focus on detailed study of innovation in six Asian economies-four of them being newly industrialized countries (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) and two being emerging economies (India and China). The other Asian economies are not included in this detailed analysis because of the relatively small number of patents they have, making detailed analysis statistically uninteresting for these countries. Sections 4 and 5 present sector-level analysis of innovation in the six Asian countries. Sections 6 and 7 study the role of multinational subsidiaries, business groups, domestic firms, government-affiliated institutes and individual players in innovation, and examine the degree of concentration of patenting activity. Section 8 offers concluding thoughts.
Comparing innovation across countries: methodology
Both patents and R&D expenditure data are commonly used indicators of innovation. The absence of uniform international accounting standards as well as unavailability of detailed R&D data makes R&D data analysis impractical for our purposes. An alternative is to use patent data. However, patent counts from different patent offices are not comparable to each other because of different patent breadths, patenting costs, approval requirements and enforcement rules for patenting in different countries. A common remedy is to use patent data from a single patent granting country like US to standardize the unit of innovation, making cross-country comparisons possible. Since the US is the largest and technologically most advanced market in the world, any sufficiently big invention being patented anywhere with a global market in mind is likely to be patented in the US as well. Over the past two decades or so, the increasing number of patents taken out by the countries in Asia and Latin America now allows us to do statistically meaningful analysis. While patenting data does not always capture the cumulative and incremental aspect of learning and innovation (Amsden and Hikino, 1994) , it still is perhaps the best means of making large-scale comparisons of innovation (Pavitt, 1988b; Griliches, 1990) .
Our dataset, which includes successful applications registered with the US Patent Office (USPTO) during 1970-1999, was obtained by combining data obtained directly from USPTO with an enhanced dataset by Hall et al. (2001) . We divide the entire period of 30 years into six consecutive 5-year periods based on the grant year (1970-1974, 1975-1979, . . . , 1995-1999) in order to reduce the erratic year-to-year variation in the data. As is common practice in use of patent data, we take the country listed in the address of the first inventor for a patent to be the country where innovation takes place. Table 2 summarizes the trends in US patents granted to inventors based in several Asian and Latin American economies from 1970 to 1999. This helps us compare the newly industrialized countries in Asia (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) with other emerging economies in Asia (India, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) and Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela). As the data indicate, the overall patenting activity of the NICs had been quite low during the earlier part of this time period, but has gone up substantially in recent years relative to the trend in aggregate worldwide patenting as well as that of emerging economies in Asia and Latin America. The growth in patenting has been much more dramatic for Taiwan and South Korea than for Hong Kong and Singapore, suggesting that former in particular have experienced a massive increase in innovative capabilities.
Comparing innovation across countries: results
As Table 3 indicates, the countries in our sample differ substantially in the extent of foreign exports. It can be argued that the incentive of inventors from a country to patent abroad would depend on the extent to which they participate in world markets. Therefore, one fear in reading too much into raw patent Table 2 US patents granted to country 's inventors: 1970 's inventors: -1999 's inventors: Recipient countries 1970 's inventors: -1974 's inventors: 1975 's inventors: -1979 's inventors: 1980 's inventors: -1984 's inventors: 1985 's inventors: -1989 's inventors: 1990 's inventors: -1994 's inventors: 1995 's inventors: -1999 Newly industrialized economies Taiwan (ROC)  1  176  397  1,772  5,271  12,366  South Korea  24  43  91  424  2,890  11,366  Hong Kong  59  75  113  177  279  570  Singapore  21  9  20  47  148  499   Emerging Asian economies  India  83  67  40  64  126  316  China  61  2  7  129  239  332  Indonesia  19  5  5  10  26  18  Malaysia  2  13  6  13  43  89  Thailand  4  3  7  11  15  56   Emerging Latin American economies  Mexico  243  246  191  202  189  257  Brazil  86  100  110  156  260  353  Argentina  126  113  100  82  109  183  Chile  22  20  12  18  32  44  Venezuela  36  35  50  103  121  145   Total worldwide  367,943  322, 385  309, 387  398,816  484,223  623,999 The numbers indicate the number of US patents granted for inventions made in these countries in the indicated time period. Source: authors' calculations based on the US Patent Office data. Table 3 Country exports: 1970 exports: -1999 exports: Recipient countries 1970 exports: -1974 exports: 1975 exports: -1979 exports: 1980 exports: -1984 exports: 1985 exports: -1989 exports: 1990 exports: -1994 exports: 1995 exports: -1999 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 Newly counts from Table 2 is that the extent of US patenting might simply reflect different size of the economies or different export orientation rather than genuine differences in innovativeness. In order to control for this possibility, we carry out a robustness check suggested by Archibugi and Pianta (1998) by dividing each country's number of US patents by their exports, giving us the normalized patenting numbers reported in Table 4 . Even after controlling for differences in foreign exports, we find that Taiwan and South Korea turn out to be far ahead of the rest in recent years.
Sector-level analysis of innovation: methodology
Aggregate patent data hide important sector-level details of innovation. The assessment of national capabilities and performance in specific fields of technology is important because technological progress, particularly within a specific paradigm, seems to proceed cumulatively along the "technological trajectories" defined by the paradigm (Dosi, 1982; Archibugi and Pianta, 1992) . The path dependency and the cumulative nature of technology together imply that a nation's technological capabilities are likely to be in the technological neighborhood of previous successes, a claim that is corroborated by evidence provided by Pavitt (1988a) and Cantwell (1989) . In the context of developed countries, it has been shown that analysis of technological convergence at the aggregate level can be very misleading, and only a sector-level analysis gives a clear picture of differences in technological capabilities of a country (Soete, 1987; Guerrieri and Milana, 1998; Patel and Pavitt, 1998; Archibugi and Pianta, 1998; Laursen, 1999) . With this in mind, we focus on identifying the fields in which different Asian countries have an advantage or weakness relative to their overall scientific and technological activities.
Definition of sectors
In coming up with our definition for industries, we used three-digit SIC codes as a starting point, but aggregated some of these up to give a total of only 33 sectors. We felt that 33 sectors was a reasonable trade-off between the richness of sectoral data and the number of patents per sector as a reliable measure of innovativeness in that sector. Our entire list of sectors, along with its mapping to SIC and ISIC codes, appears in Table 5 . We also want to classify the sectors in order to help capture the "quality" of national patterns of technological specialization. In an approach analogous to Archibugi and Pianta (1992) , we sort the 33 sectors in decreasing order of their patenting growth rate. The top 11 sectors are classified as "fast-growing" sectors, the next 11 as "medium-growing" sectors and the last 11 as "slow-growing" sectors. The complete list of sectors according to the classification for each of these periods appears in Table 6 .
Measuring sector-level specialization
A general problem with using raw patent counts is that sectors vary in the propensity to patent (Scherer, 1983) . Also, the raw numbers are obviously sensitive to our choice of sector definitions. We follow previous research (Soete, 1987; Archibugi and Pianta, 1992) in using a "relative technological advantage" (RTA) index that measures the relative distribution of a country's inventive activity in each field. Formally, the RTA index for country i in sector j is defined as the ratio of country i's share of total world patents in sector j to country i's share of total world patents, i.e.
where n ij is the number of patents of country i in sector j. By definition, this index equals 1 if the country holds the same share of worldwide patents in a given technology as in the aggregate, and is below (above) 1 if there is a relative weakness (strength). This allows 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 Miscellaneous 
Measuring overall degree of technological specialization
As a country slowly diversifies out of sectors associated with abundant endowments of the conventional factors of production like textiles, mining and food processing towards advanced sectors like machinery, transportation and chemicals, their overall specialization might fall initially (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Amsden and Hikino, 1994) . However, as they eventually approach the technological frontier, the need for internal or external economies of scale in R&D suggests that the country would start to specialize on a narrow set of new industries. Thus, a country's technological specialization could be expected to first decline and then rise as it moves from traditional to more high tech sectors.
In order to measure how evenly or unevenly the patenting activities of a given country are distributed across all the sectors, we follow previous literature in using the χ 2 -index, which is defined as
where j is the sector, p wj the percentage of total world patents in class j and p ij the percentage of patents held by country i in sector j. The more diverse a country is in relative sectoral strengths and weaknesses, the greater the value of χ 2 . Since the χ 2 -indices are calculated on the country's percentage distribution and not levels of activities across sectors, they make cross-country comparisons in specialization meaningful. Table 7 reports the top five sectors in terms of RTA as well as the overall χ 2 -index for each time period for six Asian economies: Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, India and China. 1 We start by mak-ing some general observations based on Table 7 . First, we see that the countries are quite different in their areas of specialization, and these areas tend to be persistent for each country in the short run. Second, countries differ in their degree of overall specialization, and the degree of specialization evolves differently over time for different countries. For Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, the degree of specialization (as measured by the χ 2 -index in Table 7 ) seems to have steadily fallen over time, consistent with the theory of natural evolution of a "latecomer industrializing economy" as it makes the transition from a borrower to an innovator of technology (Amsden, 1989) . Interestingly, South Korea does not show this pattern-instead, it shows an increase in the degree of specialization from the 1980s to 1990s (though the degree of specialization is somewhat lower in the late 1990s compared with early 1990s). India and China have both maintained relatively stable degrees of specialization, though the degree of specialization for India has been consistently higher (between 1.9 and 2.7) than for China (between 0.2 and 0.4).
Sector-level analysis of innovation: results

South Korea
As Table 7 shows, the top five RTA sectors have changed completely between 1980-1984 and 1995-1999 for South Korea. However, this change has been gradual as there has been a significant overlap in the top five lists between any two adjacent periods. This suggests that country-specific factors prevent rapid change in areas of specialization, though these areas do change over a sufficiently long period. During 1980-1984, none of the top five RTA sectors for South Korea appear in the "fast growing industries" list for patenting activity as defined in Table 6 . In contrast, during 1995-1999, four of the top five RTA sectors for South Korea are drawn from the fast growing industries list. This is consistent with the explanation given by Hobday (1995) that South Korea has only recently developed strong technological capabilities because of increased exposure to foreign markets and competition through increased exports in the 1970s and 1980s.
selected countries (especially China, Singapore and India), and should therefore be interpreted with caution. In the 1990s, however, the sample sizes become sufficiently large for us to have more confidence in sector-level analysis using patent data. Other non-electric machinery and equipment (1.0)
N indicates the number of US patents granted to the country in the particular period; χ 2 measures the overall degree of specialization of the country (as explained in the text). The five industries are the top five industries in terms of RTA for that country in that period, with the numbers in bracket indicating the RTA values.
The χ 2 -values over time for South Korea reveal that the overall degree of technological specialization is much higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s. The increasing value of the χ 2 -index suggests that South Korea has been making the transition from a scale-intensive phase to a technology-intensive phase of development (Bell and Pavitt, 1993 ). When we examine this finding in light of South Korea's sectoral patterns of specialization in Table 7 , this seems to be a plausible conclusion. The "heavy and chemical industries" drive was initiated by President Park in the 1970s to enhance South Korea's self-sufficiency in industrial raw materials and to upgrade its industrial structure from being labor-intensive to being capitalintensive stage. Special legislation singled out six strategic industries-steel, petrochemicals, nonferrous metals, shipbuilding, electronics and machinery-to receive support, including tax incentives, subsidized public services and preferential financing. This was followed by industrial policies of the subsequent regimes that emphasized the development of specialized industries such as semiconductors and electronics. The patenting growth for South Korea as reported in Table 1 and the specialization outcomes reported in Table 7 seem consistent with these policy measures.
Taiwan
Unlike South Korea, the areas where Taiwan has focused have remained remarkably consistent during the past 20 years. This once more highlights that country-specific drivers of technological specializa-tion are indeed quite stable. As reported in Table 7 , four out of the top five RTA sectors have remained the same from 1980-1984 to 1995-1999 . The most notable change that took place is in "electronics, radio, television and communications", where the RTA value has gone up from 0.8 during 1980-1984 to 1.6 in 1995-1999. Taiwan's top RTA industry has remained "motorcycles, bicycles and parts", where its RTA has in fact steadily increased from 4.1 in 1980-1984 to 6.0 in 1995-1999 . Comparing Taiwan's and South Korea's top RTA lists, we find that the two have specialized in different sectors, with "electronics, radio, television and communications" being the only common sector.
During the period 1980-1984, only one of the top five RTA sectors for Taiwan appears in the "fast growing industries" list for patenting activity as defined in Table 6 . In contrast, during 1995-1999, three of the top five RTA sectors for Taiwan are drawn from the fast growing industries list. Taiwan, like South Korea, seems to have developed stronger technological capabilities in areas with high overall percentage rate of increase worldwide. However, just like it lags behind South Korea in the level of technological complexity, it also seems to lag behind South Korea a little in its focus on the fast-growing industries.
The χ 2 -values over time for Taiwan reveal that the overall degree of technological specialization is just marginally lower in the 1990s than in the 1980s. This result is consistent with the evidence of relatively consistent profiles of RTA for the past 20 years. Since the l980s, an important beneficiary of the government's industrial policies in Taiwan has been the information and communication science sector. In addition to low interest loans, investment credits and favorable tariff rates for imported computer components, the government has established research institutes to facilitate the generation of new technology and the diffusion of existing technology. By 1990, Taiwan had become the sixth largest producer of computers in the world. This may explain why "electronics, radio, television and communications" is a part of the top five RTA sectors in Taiwan.
Singapore and Hong Kong
From Tables 2 and 4, it appears that the patenting activity in Singapore and Hong Kong has consistently been much lower than in South Korea and Taiwan. Singapore and Hong Kong have not been as innovative as these other newly industrialized economies, indicating much weaker technological capabilities. Therefore, the innovative performance of the so-called "Asian Tigers" is actually quite different, indicating that the drivers of growth have also been different. The number of patents for Singapore and Hong Kong has been particularly small during the earlier periods, making a detailed sector-level analysis relatively meaningful only for the 1990s, which shall be the focus of our discussion. Table 8 shows how the top five RTA sectors have evolved for Singapore and Hong Kong over time. Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, areas of high RTA seem to change substantially in Singapore and Hong Kong from one period to the next. For example, the only industry that appears in Singapore's top-five list for RTAs for both 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 is "electronics, radio, television and communications." There is, however, a clear move from relatively low-tech areas in the 1980s to high-tech areas in the 1990s. Although Singapore appears to have developed relative specialization in electronics and other high technology areas, a large fraction of Singapore's patenting activity continues to actually be a result of multinationals rather than domestic entities, as discussed later in this paper. The χ 2 -values for Singapore and Hong Kong reveal that the overall degree of technological specialization has been consistently falling over time. This is similar to the trend observed in the context of developed countries wherein countries move from niche positions to much broader bases of innovation during the transition phase. Compared with the case of Singapore, the top five RTAs have been slightly more stable over time for Hong Kong. There is a fair bit of overlap in specialization of Hong Kong and Singapore, though Singapore has developed a leadership in electronics as well as electrical goods and Hong Kong focuses on just a wider variety of electrical goods. Table 2 reveals that, although India and China are still not very large players in US patenting, they have shown a substantial surge in patenting in the 1990s. However, as Table 4 shows, this increase begins to appear smaller for India and actually negative for China Table 8 The χ N indicates the number of US patents granted to the country in the particular period; χ 2 measures the overall degree of specialization of the country (as explained in the text). The five industries are the top five industries in terms of RTA for that country in that period, with the numbers in bracket indicating the RTA values.
India and China
once we normalize for increase in foreign trade. Since the number of patents is not too large, it is perhaps not worthwhile trying to read too much into the time trends in RTAs reported in Table 9 . It seems worth noting, however, that both Indian and China seem to be building up substantial innovative capabilities in all kinds of chemicals as well as drugs and medicine. Additionally, India seems to be quite strong in plastic materials and synthetic resins.
Comparing type of innovators: methodology
Next, we turn to comparing sources of innovation across the Asian economies. In particular, we want to document the fraction of innovation arising from multinational subsidiaries, business groups, individual inventors and other domestic firms and organizations in each of these countries. 2 Given the differences in the national systems of innovation across different countries (Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993;  N indicates the number of US patents granted to the country in the particular period; χ 2 measures the overall degree of specialization of the country (as explained in the text). The five industries are the top five industries in terms of RTA for that country in that period, with the numbers in bracket indicating the RTA values. Edquist, 1997; Freeman and Soete, 1997) , we expect the composition of the set of innovators to vary substantially across countries as well. Business groups are known to play an important role in the overall economic activity of Asian economies (Khanna, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001 ). Therefore, we try to study their specific contribution to patenting. We were able to obtain data on business groups for South Korea, Taiwan and India, so we classified all domestic patent assignees from these countries into whether they had a group affiliation or not. 3 This en-abled us to calculate the fraction of patents arising from business groups for these countries. We also study role of individuals in innovation. For our purposes, patents assigned to individuals are those that are marked as either "individual" or "unassigned" in the US patent data.
Next, we turn to calculating the fraction of patents attributable to local subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, since the role that foreign multinationals play in an economy's system of innovation can differ significantly across countries (Singh, 2002; Khanna and Singh, 2002) . In order to determine whether a given patent originates from the local subsidiary of a foreign multinational, we check whether the home country of the assignee organization is the same as the country of the first inventor. A crucial step in building the dataset was therefore identifying whether an assignee firm had its home base in the country of patenting, or if it was part of a foreign firm. 4 To achieve this, we undertook the following extensive data cleaning exercise, details of which can be found in Singh (2002) . First, we used Compustat-based CUSIP numbers (from year 1989) included in the database by Hall et al. (2001) to make sure that the subsidiaries of companies that have CUSIP numbers are correctly matched to their respective corporate parents identified using the same CUSIP number. Next, we used Stopford's (1992) directory of 428 largest multinationals to manually associate all their major subsidiaries correctly with the corporate parent. Finally, for every remaining assignee, we calculated the home country as the country in which maximum numbers of patents originated for that assignee.
We also study the list of top 50 players for each of the six countries considered here. This has several goals: First, it helps identify important individual players for innovation. Second, it gives an idea of the role of non-profit research institutes versus for-profit domestic firms since both of them show up simply as "domestic firms and organizations" in US patent database. Third, calculation of the fraction of patents held by the top 50 players helps identify the extent to which innovative activity in a country is concentrated among a few players rather than dispersed among many players in the economy. Table 10 gives the composition of the set of innovators in the six Asian economies we study. Consistent with previous research (Hobday, 1995; Cheng-Fen and Sewell, 1996; Kim, 1998; Choung, 1998) , we find that business groups or chaebols have played a key role in developing South Korea's innovative capabilities. About 81% of all South Korean patents arose from business groups. In contrast, the fraction attributable to 4 We defined the subsidiary as being a company in which the multinational has a majority stake. While one can argue that even a "high enough" minority stake can give a multinational enough control over a foreign company, we wanted to avoid the situation in which a company could not be identified with a unique parent. For cases where two multinationals had exactly 50-50 stake in a company, we broke the tie by assuming it was a part of the multinational whose name appeared first in the joint venture. business groups is less than 4% for the case of Taiwan. On the other hand, individual inventors own a mere 7% of the patents coming from South Korea but as much as 59% of the patents from Taiwan. Industrial policies seem to have played an important role in shaping the innovative fabric of these countries. Unlike South Korea, where large business groups dominate, Taiwan's national system of innovation has a much greater role for small and medium sized enterprises (SME). 5 Individual inventors are also relatively important in China (40%) and Hong Kong (31%), though less so in India (18%) and Singapore (10%).
Comparing type of innovators: results
Singapore has relied quite heavily on multinationals, which account for 46% of the patenting arising from Singapore in the 1990s. 6 In analysis not reported in Table 10 , it appears that the relative role of domestic entities is beginning to go up-only 59 of the 148 patents for 1990-1994 were granted to domestic entities, while 287 of the 499 patents in 1995-1999 were owned by domestic entities. Thus, it seems that recent adoption of a more R&D-oriented policy by the government is helping Singapore to begin developing strong indigenous innovative capabilities as well.
Unlike Singapore, Hong Kong seems to have been less reliant on foreign multinationals for the patenting 5 Based on analysis of a dataset for 1994-2000 (with a different industry classification) obtained from CHI research, we find that institutes in Taiwan focus on areas such as "biotechnology", "plastics, polymers and rubbers," etc. SMEs are dominant in industries such as, "motor vehicle and parts," "other transportation equipment," "textiles and apparels," "miscellaneous machinery," etc. In terms of absolute patent numbers, SMEs are most productive in "semiconductors and electronics" with 1111 patents (31.41% of the patents), "computers and peripherals" with 249 patents (28% of the patents), and "electronics appliances and components" with 261 patents (28% of the patents). Interestingly, in the field of "semiconductors and electronics," MNEs dominate with 1830 patents (52% of total).
6 Analysis based on CHI research data reveals that local entities-mostly research institutes or government backed SMEconstituted 81% of the total 253 patents in "semiconductors and electronics" and 94% of the 17 patents in biotechnology during 1994-2000. On the other hand, multinationals in Singapore were the main source of innovation in "electrical appliances and components" and "telecommunications equipment." However, there has been an increase in the share of patents held by local entities in industries traditionally dominated by MNEs. For instance, 90% of the 20 patents in "telecommunications equipment" industry over 1986-1993 went to multinationals while the 68% of 121 patents for 1994-2000 went to multinationals. (Hobday, 1995) . The results from Table 10 highlight that innovation in Taiwan and South Korea has been almost exclusively the result of innovation by domestic entities, with multinational subsidiaries being responsible for less than 2% of the patents in the past two decades. Also, multinationals seem somewhat important in 7 Our analysis based on CHI research data suggests the industries in Hong Kong where small and medium sized enterprises have been the main source of patenting include "other industries," "industrial process equipment," "office equipment and cameras," and "electric appliances and components." India (30%) but less so for China (17%). 8 The enormous variation in the relative role of subsidiaries of foreign multinationals in innovation in different countries is explored in more detail in Singh (2002) , and in Khanna and Singh (2002) . 9 Tables 11-16 lists the top 50 patent holders from each of the six countries considered here. The lists illustrate our analysis above. For example, the Taiwanese list is dominated by "other domestic firms or organizations," the South Korean list is dominated by business groups, Singapore list is dominated by "foreign multinationals or organizations," and the Hong Kong, India and China lists are a combination of "domestic firms or organizations" and "foreign multinationals or organizations." An additional insight from LG Group 892 LG Semicon Co. Ltd.
LG Group 696 LG Electronics Inc.
LG LG Group 68 LG Industrial Systems Co. Ltd.
LG Similarly, Singapore's National Technology Plan and National Science and Technology Board made major investments to fund R&D and increase the number of local researchers in the 1990s, which may account for the increase in patents during the late 1990s by institutes such as the National University of Singapore and domestic SMEs affiliated with it. For China and also India to some extent, the top 50 inventors list seems to have a disproportionately high number of research institutes and government-affiliated organizations, indicating that private-sector R&D and innovation has not developed much yet in these countries. We can also calculate the fraction of the country's patents held by its top 50 assignees in order to get a measure of how concentrated innovative activity is in different economies. This number is found to be the highest for South Korea (85%), followed by Singapore (70%), India (63%), Hong Kong (32%), Taiwan (26%) and finally China (24%). This is not surprising, given that economic activity in South Korea and Singapore is dominated largely by large players (whether domestic or multinational) while that in Taiwan and China is dominated by individuals and SMEs.
Concluding thoughts
We have used US patent data to study innovation in Asian economies. Our results are consistent with prior evidence (Dahlman, 1994; Rausch, 1995; Choung, 1998) that there has been a rise in technological capability over time in East Asian economies, and dramatically so for South Korea and Taiwan. Another key finding of our paper is that the emerging economies are quite heterogeneous bunch in their technological capabilities. In particular, they differ a lot in extent of patenting, areas of specialization and driving players behind innovation. We demonstrate that the newly industrialized countries have achieved leadership even in sectors that are on the frontier of technological progress, and are not specializing in just the more mature sectors where the developed countries might not compete in anymore. Further, the areas of specialization for each country have evolved very slowly over time. Thus, our analysis extends previous research that reached analogous conclusions in study of patenting activity by developed countries (Patel and Pavitt, 1998; Archibugi and Pianta, 1998) . More generally, it contributes to the literature that shows that the sources and areas of technological specialization are heavily dependent on the individual national systems of innovation (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997; Freeman and Soete, 1997) .
Previous research has established that wide differences in nations have led to a great deal of variation across countries in the economic role played by multinationals, business groups, individuals, private firms and government institutes. Our analysis of patent data is consistent with this finding. For example, while large-scale conglomerates like Samsung, Daewoo, Hyundai and LG Group dominate innovation in South Korea, innovation in Taiwan and Hong Kong is a result of domestic individuals and independent firms and that in Singapore is heavily influenced by foreign firms. We find innovative activity to be most concentrated in South Korea, fairly concentrated in Singapore and much less concentrated in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
While the data and analysis presented in this paper do not conclusively settle the accumulation versus assimilation debate, we feel that they do make new and interesting contribution to the discussion. While South Korea and Taiwan are now definitely two of the world's leading innovators, Singapore and Hong Kong do not seem to have made any such transition yet (though the recent trends are promising). This may partially be explained by the fact that while the former two have been taking aggressive policy steps to develop indigenous technological capabilities, the latter two have been quite content (until recently) in importing foreign technologies rather than making cutting-edge innovations themselves. An important lesson is that the "Asian Tigers" are actually a heterogeneous bunch, and different mechanisms could be behind economic success in different countries. While the evidence in this paper informally suggests that innovation might play an important role in growth, more needs to be done to address this problem formally. Important contributions have already been made in studying this subject (e.g. see the excellent discussions and references in Archibugi and Michie, 1998a,b; Archibugi et al., 1999; Laursen, 2000) . However, most research has focused only on developed countries, leaving room for further research on innovation in other parts of the world. We hope that our paper will be useful in motivating further research in this area.
